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OPINION OF THE COURT
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Mark Gordon appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his complaint for
failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
For the reasons that follow, we
will affirm.
I.
Inasmuch as we write only for the parties, it is not necessary to recite in detail the
factual and procedural history of this case. Rather, it is sufficient to simply note that
Gordon was accused of sexually abusing his stepdaughter following an investigation by a
social worker employed by the City of Philadelphia. Gordon filed an administrative
appeal, and the sexual abuse accusation was formally expunged. Thereafter, he filed a
two-count complaint in the district court. Count One was a 1983 malicious prosecution
claim alleging that the City and the social worker violated Gordon’s substantive due

process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Count Two was a state law claim for
malicious abuse of process.
The district court ruled that the applicable statute of limitations began to run when
Gordon knew he had been falsely accused, not when he was exonerated, and his claim
was therefore time-barred. The court also concluded that Gordon failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted because a 1983 malicious prosecution claim is not
cognizable under the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment.
For reasons that are not readily apparent, Gordon only argues that the district court erred
in holding that the statute of limitations began to run when he was first formally accused.
However, we need not address that because we agree that his claim for malicious
prosecution is not cognizable under 1983. Accordingly, we affirm.
At the outset, we note that Gordon clearly accuses the City and the social worker
of maliciously prosecuting him. His complaint reads, in relevant part: "In the course of
fighting the battle to clear his name, Mr. Gordon has been investigated and falsely and
maliciously prosecuted as a sexual abuser of children. . . ." Compl. 125 (emphasis
added). Moreover, his 1983 malicious prosecution claim is grounded in the substantive
due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment. He alleges that the City’s and the
social worker’s actions "constitute intentional and reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s
substantive due process rights as guaranteed to them (sic) by the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution." Compl.
133 (emphasis added).
However, after the Court’s decision in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994), it
is beyond argument that a claim of malicious prosecution under 1983 cannot be based
on substantive due process considerations. Instead, it must be based on a provision of
the Bill of Rights providing "an explicit textual source of constitutional protection." 510
U.S. at 272. Moreover, we have recognized that after Albright a 1983 malicious
prosecution claim cannot be grounded in substantive due process. Torres v. McLaughlin,
163 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 1998).
Nonetheless, acknowledging that Albright held open the
possibility of bringing a 1983 malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth
Amendment, we have held that a 1983 malicious prosecution claim can be based on the
Fourth Amendment, the procedural due process clause or other explicit text of the
Constitution. Id. at 173. However, here, Gordon’s complaint clearly establishes that his
1983 action is based only on substantive due process. Therefore, he has failed to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the district court properly dismissed
under Rule 12(b)(6).
II.
For the above reason, we will affirm the district court.
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